

Advanced Persistent Marketing

Demystifying Advanced Persistent Threats and Cyber Espionage



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About the presenter

Lance James

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✦ Author of "Phishing Exposed" and co-author of "Emerging Threat Analysis"

✦ Advisory board member of the Digital PhishNet

✦ Centre for Strategic Cyberspace + Security Science (CSCSS.org), creator of InvisibleNet (IIP/I2P)

✦ Co-Founder of Secure Science Corporation

✦ Loves Karaoke

✦ Very Hyper (but quiet in the evenings)

Lance has more than a decade of experience in programming, network security, digital forensics, malware research, cryptography design & cryptanalysis, attacking protocols, and deep experience in information security, and has provided consultation to small start-ups, national and international governments, and Fortune 500 companies, including top American financial institutions.



Life-Like Drawing

Digital 007

- Are we really surprised?
 - ✦ The game has never changed just the environment
 - ✦ Dossiers of yesterday are your databases today
- Fourth Generation Warfare Theory (asymmetric)
 - ✦ Terrorism, insurgencies
 - ✦ Decentralized
 - ✦ Opportunistic
 - ✦ Psychological and guerilla tactics
 - ✦ Survival and influence - typical goal
 - Affects the cost of warfare
 - Belief vs. duty

Adversaries

→ Nation-State

- ✦ Drivers such as economic, political, war, belief, revenge

→ Corporate

✦ Intellectual property theft

- Is it that common?
- Mostly insider threats
- Risk of Incarceration (ROI)

→ Insurgencies

- ✦ Non-state sponsored
- ✦ Pro-state or rebels
- ✦ Cyber paramilitary factions
 - Electronic armies

Wild Wild Web

→ Increasingly hostile Internet

- ✦ Conflicts are no longer physically separated
- ✦ Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS), swatting, phishing/malware, turf wars, espionage
- ✦ Global unrest means Internet unrest

→ Problems solved

- ✦ Phishing?
- ✦ Malware?
- ✦ Espionage?
- ✦ DDoS?

→ And now add anonymity

- ✦ Tor, I2P, Bitcoin, Virtual Private Network (VPN) proxies
- ✦ Silk Road, CryptoLocker, TorLocker, Dyre, CryptoWall

Rethinking information security

→ InfoSec castle defense methodology

- ✦ Armor up and await attacks
- ✦ Shiny boxes with blinking lights
 - Is this a technology problem?
 - Is this a cost problem?

→ Security monitoring

- ✦ One team to monitor all
 - Cognitive overload
 - Total Cost of Ownership is not lowered
- ✦ Threat feed correlations
 - Many organizations are not ready for threat intelligence
 - Threat feeds ≠ threat intelligence



Awareness exercises

→ Example

- ✦ Intelligence comes out on the wire
 - An electronic army group hacks a celebrity social media account

→ What is your first question? Usually –

- ✦ Who did it? Why?
- ✦ What tools, tactics, procedures (TTPs)?
- ✦ What is the impact?

→ What about this question?

- ✦ What was the target's timeline?
- ✦ What provoked the attacker?

→ What do we learn?

- ✦ Adversaries habits
 - Media, motives and maneuvers



Counterintelligence

→ Spy vs. spy

- ✦ Espionage countermeasure is counterintelligence
- ✦ Insurgency countermeasure is counterinsurgency
- ✦ Terrorism countermeasure is counterterrorism

→ Counterintelligence (CI) serves as subset of security


- ✦ One without the other does not work
- ✦ CI introduces toolset empowering agile strategy
- ✦ Perception and deception management
- ✦ Behavior analysis, psychology, information security, investigations, human intelligence (HUMINT)
- ✦ Self- and situational awareness
 - Complements threat modeling
 - Attacks are reactive and possibly controllable

Advanced or organized?

- Today's Advanced Persistent Threat (APT)
 - ✦ We called the technique “hacking” in the 90's
 - ✦ Tools and tactics are the same as they have always been
 - ✦ Cyber crime is opportunistic, i.e., grab all, get out
 - ✦ Cyber espionage is strategic in nature


- Organized Persistent Threat (OPT)
 - ✦ Planned for persistence
 - ✦ Move laterally through the network
 - ✦ Malware typically used for entry
 - ✦ Human-driven, manually operated
 - ✦ Motive is the biggest differentiator

Common factor



Where do we begin?

1. Plan, based on knowledge of risks and attack vectors
2. Gather information
3. Normalize data
4. Construct a meaningful picture
5. Distribute to the right audience
6. Improve future intelligence



from https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/analytic-culture-in-the-u-s-intelligence-community/chapter_4_systems_model.htm

Cyber Counterintelligence (CCI)

- The efforts made by security teams to prevent hostile or criminal or adversarial organizations from successfully gathering and collecting intelligence against them
- “Actionable” is found in deeply analyzing observable details left by attackers’ TTPs
- Traditional defensive counterintelligence
 - ✦ Focused on human intelligence and spies
 - ✦ Developed during World War II, and has continued to evolve
- Applicable to cyber

Discipline	Defensive CI
HUMINT	Deception in operations security
SIGINT	Radio OPSEC, use of secure telephones, SIGSEC, deception
COMINT	Deception, OPSEC countermeasures, deception (decoys, camouflage)

CCI process

→ Countering espionage

- ✦ Fix the basics via threat modeling
 - Information
 - Secrets
 - Actors


→ Self-awareness first

- ✦ Example: single-use Point-of-Sale (POS) breach
 - Why does POS have access to Internet?
- ✦ Lateral movement solved through segmentation

→ Situational-awareness

- ✦ Know yourself and control your enemy
- ✦ Perception management

Adversarial awareness



Do you know your network?

→ Your network has more intelligence...

- ✦ Than anything you will find on the Internet
- ✦ Than any threat intelligence provider

→ Success comes from understanding

✦ What is your network doing?

- Why is Dynamic DNS used on my network?
- Why have I never seen this domain before?
- Location, entropy, non-existing domain (NXD), cache, non-DNS

→ Known good

- ✦ Do you know what good behavior looks like?
- ✦ Solve the good, minimize the bad

Threat intelligence team

→ Pro-active in nature

- ✦ Threat research team
- ✦ Gain adversary understanding

→ Threat indicators “indicate” what?

COMPONENT	EXPLANATION
<i>Motivation</i>	<i>The level of intensity and degree of focus</i>
<i>Objectives</i>	<i>Boasting rights, disruption, destruction, learn secrets, make money</i>
<i>Timeliness</i>	<i>How quickly they work (years, months, days, hours)</i>
<i>Resources</i>	<i>Well funded to unfunded (tools and tactics provide insight)</i>
<i>Risk Tolerance</i>	<i>High (don't care) to low (never want to be caught)</i>
<i>Skills and Methods</i>	<i>How sophisticated are the exploits (scripting to hardware lifecycle attacks)</i>
<i>Actions</i>	<i>Well rehearsed, ad hoc, random, controlled versus uncontrolled</i>
<i>Attack Origination Points</i>	<i>Outside, inside, single point, diverse points</i>
<i>Numbers Involved in Attack</i>	<i>Solo, small group, big group</i>
<i>Knowledge Source</i>	<i>Chat groups, web, oral, insider knowledge, espionage</i>

Behavior analysis team

→ Behavior profiling

- ✦ Is your company doing this?
 - Skills and abilities
 - Resources
 - Motives/motivations
 - Complexity

→ Threat actor attribution and neutralization

- ✦ Requires agile strategic planning
- ✦ Attribution framework
 - Who is attacking you?
- ✦ Operational deception
 - Increase risk, decrease reward

Attribution team

→ Does attribution help?

- ✦ Long game, yes
- ✦ Neutralization, exposure, legal action
- ✦ Keeping them out – you know why they reacted
- ✦ If they are known or visible they are compromised
- ✦ Determines their methods

→ What to analyze?

TTP ANALYSIS	RESULT
<i>Incident Tracking</i>	<i>Is this similar to other incidents</i>
<i>Vulnerability / Exploit</i>	<i>Tools, and attack methods</i>
<i>Modus Operandi, Signature, Content, Pattern</i>	<i>Classification of campaigns and activity</i>
<i>Tools</i>	<i>Establish skill set and resources</i>
<i>Utilization of Access</i>	<i>Motive, maneuverability, familiarity</i>
<i>Data Transfer Technique</i>	<i>Identify, detect, locate, method</i>
<i>OPSec</i>	<i>Logging alterations, deletion techniques</i>

Adversary interaction (i.e., HUMINT)

→ Should we?

- ✦ Is it our job?
- ✦ Leave it to the Government?
- ✦ Where's the line when protecting our networks?
- ✦ Should we purchase our own stolen data?

→ Skills required

- ✦ Psychology
 - Perception management
 - Transactional analysis
 - Cognitive behavior
 - Game theory
- ✦ Law
 - Entrapment

Cyber espionage

→ Basic information security achieved

- ✦ Solve those (one at a time)
- ✦ Save yourself lots of trouble

→ People vs. technology

✦ Security serves the business

- Invest in the right people
- Set the expectations for investing in technology

✦ Don't panic

- Lots of security “theater” out there
- Stay strategic

✦ They are no more advanced than your enterprise

- They are persistent about getting in
- Be persistent about keeping them out

Questions?



Thank you

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